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21. Introduction.
Belgium and Denmark offer marked contrasts in many of their labour market
institutions. Belgium has long been considered by many as exemplifying the economic problem
known as Eurosclerosis. Indeed, Belgium did have (and to some extent still has) almost all of
the negative institutional characteristics often associated with poor economic performance:
high job protection, rigid wages and generous unemployment insurance compensation.
Denmark, on the other hand, has long been considered as an example of a country that has
successfully achieved a good balance between social protection and economic growth. Below
we shall discuss the differences between the two countries in detail but in Table 1 we present
some of the features of the two labour markets along with those of a selection of other
countries, to provide some context. These rankings are taken from the 1997 global
competitiveness report (World Economic Forum, 1997). The Table gives the ranking (out of
53 countries) for various labour market indicators. In each case a higher  ranking (closer to
1) means ‘more advantageous for employers’ (as conventionally seen -  alternatively, a high
score can be seen as ‘bad for workers’). Of particular note is the fact that Belgium consistently
has scores that indicate ‘negative’ institutional characteristics. On the other hand, Denmark is
much more mixed. For example, it is seen as having generous Unemployment Insurance (UI)
provisions but it also has the lowest impediments to hiring and firing (lower even than
Singapore or Hong Kong).
Belgium and Denmark are both small open economies whose primary trading partner
is Germany. They also both have a relatively generous social safety net. The major difference
between their labour markets is the higher firing costs in Belgium. Thus it is very tempting to
compare the outcomes of workers in the two countries who are displaced from a long tenure
job to identify how these outcomes differ and whether they can be attributed to the differences
in firing provisions. This comparison is made even more attractive by the availability of two
comparable administrative data sets describing both the Belgian and Danish labor markets.
In this work, we will use these data sets to compare worker displacement and worker
adjustment to displacement in Belgium and Denmark.
2. Labour market institutions.
Appendix A provides an extended discussion of labour market institutions in Belgium
and Denmark. Here we provide a brief description.
2.1 Employment protection.
Belgian law recognizes the basic principle of employment at will, so that only in a few
cases (union representatives, pregnant women and workers on parental leave, for example)
does an employer have to have a just cause to justify the dismissal of an employee. However,
laying off workers can have high costs since Belgian law guarantees workers long notice
periods and in some cases generous mandatory severance payments. The notice periods for
blue collar workers are relatively short: 4 and 8 weeks for workers with less than 20 years
of service and those with more than 20 years, respectively. White collar workers (who
3represent about 40% of the workforce) have to be given much longer period of notice. White
collar workers are given three months of notice plus three months per completed five years
of seniority. For high wage white collar workers, these are lower bounds. The actual period
of notice has to be set in agreement between the employer and the employee. When no accord
can be reached, the length of notice is set by the Labor Courts. Blanpain (1994) estimates that
precedents tend to show that the length of notice Courts grant to these high paid employees is
a function of age, specialization, tenure and wage. They can go as high as 36 months. Of
course, all these restrictions do not apply during trial periods (generally two weeks for blue
collar workers, but up to six months for white collar workers). In addition to notice, Belgian
workers (blue and white collar workers) are given large severance payments in case of a plant
closure. These payments amount to roughly one months salary per year of seniority, plus some
additional compensation for high wage and older workers. In the case of mass layoffs, some
severance pay – although much less generous – is also due. There are no mandated severance
payments for individual layoffs.
In contrast to this, the Danish industrial relations system is characterised by a small
amount of interference from the state. This includes employment protection legislation but this
is very limited. There are two major provisions, which are both about advance notice. The
first provision is limited to white collar workers who have to be given an advance notice. The
length depends on the tenure of the worker with a maximum of six months. This set of rules
were enacted in 1938. The second provision are the different rules about mass layoffs enacted
by the European Union. The Danish legislation in this respect has followed the minimum
required by the EU, which has undergone some changes since Denmark joined the EU in 1973.
The restrictions on the behaviour of the employers are moderate: they have to submit a notice
to the regional labour market board and they have to go into negotiations with their employees
before the layoff can be enacted. Other than this, general rules about employment protection
are absent from the Danish labour market. This includes the complete absence of severance
pay, unless it has been agreed upon in a voluntary contract between the employer and the
single employee. Such agreements are relatively uncommon. Just as in Belgium, procedures
for dismissal are also absent; that is, employers are not required to act “fairly” or in a
“socially responsibly” way. It should be noted, however, that there are some provisions for
specific groups in the labour market; this includes, for example,  pregnant workers and
workers on maternal leave and persons who are elected by their fellow workers as
representatives for negotiations with the employer. However, these provisions do not apply
in the case of mass layoffs. 
2.2 Wage setting.
Belgian wages are generally thought to be rigid. This rigidity can probably be linked
to the pyramidal bargaining taking place. Contracts can be bargained at the national, industry
and firm level. Agreements struck at a higher level immediately become lower bounds for
bargaining at lower levels. These of course limit the downward real wage flexibility at firm
level, especially given the fact that as a general rule, Belgian wages are automatically indexed.
The main feature of the structure of Belgian pattern of wage bargaining pertinent to our study
is the portability of seniority. Indeed, workers changing jobs between firms within the same
bargaining unit (often an  industry) keep their accrued seniority. This considerably limits their
4ability to accept wage cuts, even if a worker is willing to do so.
The Danish labour market is heavily unionized with 80-90 percent of Danish workers
being members of trade unions. For the time period considered below, centralised negotiations
in the private sector took place every second year between the Confederation of Unions, which
represents both skilled and unskilled workers, and the Confederation of Employers. There
were different levels of bargaining at lower levels, including bargaining between single
employers and shop-stewards. Interference by the state in the bargaining process is limited to
the centralized level in instances where agreement has not been reached. The state does not
extend contracts between employers and unions to employers who are not covered by
collective agreements. There are no formal minimum wage laws in Denmark. This implies that
despite the fact that the Danish system at face value looks very unionized and centralized, there
are loopholes with respect to the acceptance of wage reductions. It is not known how large is
the share of workers who are covered by collective agreements but recent figures of as low
as about fifty percent have been suggested although a more likely figure is about 75%.
2.3 Unemployment Insurance provisions.
The Belgian system of Unemployment Insurance (UI) is said to be one of the most
generous in the world (Burda, (1988)). As a general rule, benefits do not expire in Belgium.
However, they are reduced after one and two years of unemployment. In fact, a closer look at
the Belgian UI system indicates that it hardly qualifies as an insurance system. First, students
can qualify for benefits even if they have never been employed. Second, and more importantly,
benefits are means tested. The official replacement rate is 60% of the lost wage during the first
year of unemployment and 40% after that. Practically, these rates are meaningless. Many UI
recipients receive a compensation which is entirely based on family status and income. Thus
‘heads’ of households receive a flat amount which can be higher than 60% of their lost wages,
whilst the benefits of most other workers are limited by a cap on benefits and are often below
60% of their lost wages.
The Danish UI system is closer to a true insurance scheme in that it does not have a
mean test for benefits but it also has many features (such as the absence of differentiation with
respect to risk) that reduce the insurance element. It is considered ‘generous’ compared to
most other countries, both with respect to the level and duration of benefits. The maximum
amount in unemployment benefit is 90 percent of the previous wage, but this is only obtained
by workers with low previous wage levels. At the beginning of the 1980´s, the benefit level
was capped at about the average wage level for workers in the private sector. Since that time
this maximum has been eroded considerably so that now the average replacement ratio is about
65 percent. Thus Danish workers with high wage levels have a replacement ratio that is
somewhat lower than in many other countries. Formally, there is a maximum duration period,
but until the beginning of the 1990´s unemployed workers could become eligible for continued
benefit by participating in a public employment scheme. This implied that the duration period
were practically unlimited. Unemployment benefit is limited to persons who are members of
an unemployment insurance fund, which is typically run by a union. About 80 percent of
Danish private sector workers are members of an unemployment insurance fund. In order to
become a member, workers have to fulfil a requirement of work experience. In the 1980´s, six
months of work within one year was required. However, persons who graduate from schools
5aiming at a particular trade or as skilled workers in the apprenticeship system also have a right
to become members of an unemployment insurance fund. 
3. Data.
3.1 The data sets.
For Belgium, we use administrative data from the Belgian social security system. All
Belgian workers, with the exception of tenured employees of the federal government, are
included in that database. The data provide one record per employee per employer per year,
plus information about potential spells of unemployment. In these records, we directly observe
the age and sex of the worker, the wage, the number of days worked and a broad occupational
classification (blue collar/white collar). From these records, it is possible to reconstruct
employee and firm histories and a (censored) measure of tenure. We do not however directly
observe the reasons for separation from a job. Nor do we observe any family characteristics,
so that we cannot re-construct UI benefit entitlements. In our computations for both countries,
public sector jobs will be excluded (although workers who are displaced from a private firm
and find a job in the public sector will be included).
The Danish data is based on the fact that all Danish residents have a personal number.
A very wide variety of transactions are recorded against these personal numbers. These data
are then centralised and collated by Danmarks Statistics and are available for research
purposes (subject to very stringent controls to maintain confidentiality). Thus, in principle, it
is possible to track all adult Danish residents from 1980 to 1994 (the latest year for which
information is available) and to analyse a wide variety of behaviour. Moreover, individuals
can be linked to each other to form households and they can also be linked to the plants at
which they work which themselves can be followed over time. Thus there is considerable
scope for research into the labour market allowing for demographic and plant information.
In this study we take a sub-sample of workers in private firms and follow then from 1980 to
1991. Unfortunately, although the initial sample size is reasonably large (37,319 workers) we
are left with only a few workers in specific strata which somewhat limits the precision of
some of the analysis below. For example, the restriction to high tenure workers leaves 15,860
workers and then the number of these displaced in the reference year is only 547!
The major difference between the two data sets is the fact that the Belgian data are firm
based, whilst the Danish is plant based. A second (minor) difference is that all ‘point in time’
wage and employment variables for Belgium are defined for the end of the year whereas they
are defined for mid November for Denmark.
3.2 Firm/plant identification and false ‘deaths’.
In Belgium, firms are identified by a unique taxpayer number that can survive change
in ownership. A firm ID number will change only if the firm disappears as a corporation (the
ID will not change if the corporation is taken over) and all its debts have been paid in full.
Given the nature of Belgian industrial organisation (big holding companies holding shares in
6many corporations), corporations rarely disappear. Although they are probably more rare than
in the U.S., mergers happen. Some firms also die and revive under a different name. To control
for that possibility we proceeded as follows: dying firms where at least 70% of the workers
were rehired (in order not to meet our criteria for being called a displacing firm) and 70% of
those rehired were rehired in a single firm were not considered to be displacing firms.
In Denmark, an establishment is considered a continuing establishment if any one of
the following four criteria is satisfied from one year to the next: there is the same owner and
same industry; there is the same owner and largely the same employees; there is the same
employees and the same industry or there is the same employees and the same address. More
precisely, “same industry” means the same ISIC-code at the 5 digit level, and “same
employees” in the second case, means that either at least 30% of the first employees remain
at the plant or make up at least 30% of the second-year employees, while “same employees”,
in the third and fourth cases, means that at least 30% of the first employees remain at the plant
and make up at least 30% of the second-year employees. Note that these classifications
depend on the whole labour force and not on the specific sample that we use below.
With such a classification, it is possible to categorise a worker as ‘displaced’ even
though we would not consider the workers as being genuinely displaced. This can happen if
a share of the workers at a plant is taken over by another plant. Our database contains
variables to take this situation into account. For continuing plants, these plants are considered
“non-identical” if at least 2 workers find employment in another plant - we refer to such firms
as “spin offs”.  For plants that close these plants are considered “taken over” by another plant,
if the number of the workers employed in the other plant are at least 2 and these workers
constitute at least 30 percent of the workforce in the closed plant; we term these “take overs”.
For the present purposes, the following rules apply: the “spin offs” will be considered
displaced workers (note that movements within a firm are given first priority, i.e. “spin offs”
within a firm are not considered displaced) but “take overs” will not be considered displaced
workers (they are placed in the category “other workers”).
3.3 Defining displacement.
We will label as ‘displaced’ all the workers who separate from a firm (or plant)
where employment has been reduced by 30% or more during the reference year and which had
more than 5 employees before the layoffs started. In the sample used below multiple job
holders are always excluded and workers having less than three years tenure at the time of
displacement are usually excluded. We have also constructed two comparison groups. The
first one is made of workers with at least three years of tenure continuing in employment in
firms (plants, for Denmark) which displaced workers (that is, they were still employed at that
firm at the end of the displacing year). The second comparison group is made up of workers
with at least three years tenure employed at other plants or firms. The exception to the three
years tenure rule is when we compute displacement rates. Thus the analysis of the after
displacement outcomes and transitions given below includes only workers with three years
or more of tenure and excluding multiple job holders. This study of outcomes will look at
displaced workers’ histories up to three years after their job loss.
74. Results.
4.1 Who is displaced?
To put our results in context, we first present some aggregate statistics for Belgium and
Denmark for the years before and after our sample period. The first panel in Table 2 presents
the sample years. The other panels present some statistics on aggregate unemployment, growth,
inflation and real wages. In the period before the sample period, Belgium was suffering a
recession and unemployment grew quite quickly (from 7.8% to 11.7%). In contrast, the pre-
sample years in Denmark were relatively healthy, although the economy declined in the sample
year. The post-sample experiences are much more similar, except that average manufacturing
wages declined in Belgium but not in Denmark. In both countries unemployment increased a
little in the post-sample period even though there was modest real growth. We take these
statistics to indicate that the post-sample macro environment in the two countries were similar
and are unlikely to account for any large differences in outcomes that we observe below.
In Table 3 we present the incidence of displacement in Belgium and Denmark (for all
workers). Although there are some significant differences, the most striking feature of this
Table is that long tenure workers (those with three or more years with the firm/plant) are just
as likely to be displaced in Denmark as in Belgium (3,45% and 3,41% respectively). This
comes as something of a surprise since, as we have seen, Belgium has very stringent lay-off
rules and Denmark has very weak ones. The major difference between the two countries is that
short tenure workers in Denmark are more likely to be displaced and Danish workers (short
tenure and long tenure) are much more likely to be displaced from a shrinking firm than from
a dying one. There are two possible explanations for this latter. It may reflect the fact that in
Belgium it is more difficult for firms that continue in business to lay off workers or it may be
that Danish plants are less likely to go out of business, perhaps because they are larger. With
the data to hand we are unable to distinguish between these alternatives.
In Table 4 we present some of the characteristics of displaced workers. Since our
primary focus is on long tenure workers we present results only for workers who had at least
three years of tenure at the plant/firm where they worked in the sample period. We also break
down the sample by whether the firm closed down or not. Finally, we present the same
statistics for workers who continued in ‘shrinking’ firms and for workers who were not in
firms that displaced workers. Comparing the latter to the displaced sample, we see that
displaced workers in Belgium tend to have slightly lower tenure (but remember that all the
workers here have at least three years tenure); to have lower wages; to be more likely to be
blue collar and to work for smaller firms than ‘other workers’. It is also clear that women are
more likely to be displaced. There are similar differentials for firm size, tenure and being blue
collar in Denmark but the differences in wages and gender composition are much smaller in
Denmark.
Finally we present an analysis of the characteristics of the displaced using a simple
Probit for being displaced (see Table 5); note that here we include all workers, not just the
long term. The first column provides a comparison with ‘all non-displaced workers’ and the
second is a comparison with those who remain in displacing firms. In Belgium the categories
more likely to be displaced are: male, blue collar, lower wage and low tenure. There is no
8significant effect of age for those aged between 20 and 60 but workers aged over 60 are more
likely to be displaced. The results for the comparison with those in displacing firms are
somewhat different. In particular, the tenure effect are now stronger (with workers with less
than one year of tenure being much more likely to be displaced than other workers). Despite
the differences in sign, the age effects are similar (note that the comparisons are with ‘under
20' group so that the change in sign only tells us something about this group). In Denmark, the
probabilities of being displaced are quite similar to those for the ‘other’ comparisons in
Belgium. Thus the first columns of Tables 4 and 5 give a similar picture in comparisons of
who is displaced in the two countries. For the comparison with ‘non-displaced’ workers,
however, the Danish results do not show any significant differences in the tenure effects. All
in all, there are only relatively minor differences between the personal characteristics of
workers who are displaced in Belgium and Denmark. The main differences seen in Table 4 -
in the proportion who are white collar workers and the firm size - reflect differences found
in the ‘other worker’ sample. As we shall see below, there are quite sharp differences in the
post-displacement experiences for workers in the two countries; the results presented in
Tables 4 and 5 suggest that these differences in outcomes are unlikely to be due to the sample
composition of the displaced groups.
4.2 Post displacement employment outcomes.
In Table 6 we present some statistics on the unemployment outcomes after
displacement (once again, only for long tenure workers). Specifically, this gives details of
how many months of unemployment displaced workers experience in the three years after the
displacement. It is most important to note that these statistics give information on (registered)
unemployment after displacement and not  non-employment. Thus someone who withdraws
from the labour force after displacement or remains in the labour force but does not register
as unemployed would not be included in the 'unemployed' here. These results reveal some
extraordinary differences between Belgium and Denmark and between these countries and
other countries. First, almost two thirds of Danish workers experience no interruption in
employment (or unemployment in the subsequent three years) as against one third for Belgium.
The latter figure is more in line with the international experience so one immediate worry is
that the Danish figure is incorrect. One possibility is that in the Danish sample we are mis-
classifying workers and our displaced sample actually includes some workers who are found
employment in other plants within the same firm. Although we cannot completely rule this out,
as we have documented in the data section above we have gone to great lengths to ensure that
we are not making such an error. We also note that the proportion of all workers in Denmark
who experience some unemployment in our reference year is 23%. This is in line with
aggregate statistics that are compiled from different sources which leads us to believe that our
calculations are not seriously biased.
Turning to workers who do experience some unemployment we see that Danish
workers are unemployed for an average of five months but Belgian workers have average
spells of 15 months (but note that any spell is truncated above at 36 months). Now it is the
Belgian results that are out of line with the wider international experience. To investigate these
differences, we also present a  more detailed inspection of the distribution of spell lengths.
From these we see that Danish workers either move out of unemployment relatively quickly
9(more than 50% of those exiting unemployment do so within about two months) or tend to stay
for long spells. By contrast, the majority of workers who become unemployed in Belgium tend
to have long spells - less than one half of them have left unemployment after one year.
Combining the probability of having any unemployment and the mean spell length, we
see that a Belgian displaced worker has an expected unemployment spell length of about ten
months as against six weeks for a Danish worker. What could account for such large
differences? Here we informally list some possibilities. The first possibility is that there is
a difference in definitions. The definitions of unemployment in our two samples are not exactly
the same but they are so close that it is not credible that the differences in outcomes are
attributable to this. A second possibility is that there are differences in sample composition,
that is, that the composition of the displaced worker groups are very different in the two
countries. As we saw in Table 4, however, the two samples appear to have similar personal
characteristics so that it is unlikely that it is this that accounts for the differences in
unemployment outcomes. A third possibility is that the differences are due to differences in
notice provisions. As discussed in the institutions section, generally workers in Belgium
receive more advance notice of closures and mass lay-offs than workers in Denmark.
Conventional search models would then suggest the converse of what we observe. Similar
remarks apply to a fourth possibility, namely that the differences in outcomes can be attributed
to differences in Unemployment Insurance systems. Both Denmark and Belgium are usually
regarded as having very ‘generous’ UI systems (see, for example, Table 1 above) but, as
discussed in the institutions section, this is something of an illusion for Belgium. In fact, an
unemployed  worker in Denmark is more likely to receive high benefits than a comparable
worker in Belgium. This is because Belgian benefits are means tested so that married workers
with an employed spouse do not receive much. Given this, we regard it as extremely unlikely
that the differences in unemployment outcomes in Belgium and Denmark are due to differences
in the UI system. Indeed, we can go further and question whether the ‘generosity’ of the UI
system in Belgium ‘causes’ the observed long unemployment spells, given that the UI system
in Denmark is at least as ‘generous’ and unemployment spells are much shorter. This is clearly
work for the future but we note here that this conclusion - that the long spells in Belgium are
unlikely to be solely the result of the UI system - highlights the virtue of making cross-country
comparisons. 
A fifth possibility is that the payment of severance pay to long tenure workers in
Belgium facilitates longer unemployment spells there. Certain aspects of the results presented
here are consistent with this. For example, the longer duration for the longest tenure workers,
(see the discussion of Table 8). Moreover, this effect is absent for Denmark where severance
pay is not usually paid. This is certainly an explanation that deserves closer inspection but the
data to hand do not report severance pay so that we cannot follow this through here. A sixth
possible explanation for the differences between the two countries is the different cyclical
effects in the two countries. As discussed above, however, Belgium and Denmark experienced
fairly similar cyclical conditions after the reference year; it is difficult to believe that such
small differences could lead to such large differences in outcomes. Yet another alternative
(number seven) is that because the UI system in Denmark is administered by the unions they
have more incentive or more ability to find displaced workers new jobs. We discuss the
administration of the system in detail in Appendix A but here it is sufficient to note that
although the unions administer UI payments they have no direct incentive to move workers
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from unemployment to a new job, so that we consider unlikely that this explains the
differences.
An eighth alternative is that labour demand conditions differ significantly across the
two countries. Although the cyclical conditions in the countries are similar, it is still possible
that there could be permanently lower arrival rates of job offers in Belgium. In a conventional
search model this would lead to longer unemployment durations. This would also be consistent
with the major difference in employers’ firing flexibility  between the two countries. Thus,
high firing costs in Belgium lead to employers being less willing to hire and to consequently
longer durations. If this explanation is to be consistent with the roughly equal unemployment
rates in the two countries (see table 2) then it means that flows into unemployment must be
much higher in Denmark. Given that displacement rates in Denmark are not dramatically higher
than in Belgium (see Table 3) this means that the bulk of Danish unemployment has to be the
result of something other than displacement. We cannot check this with the data to hand but this
is clearly a promising avenue of future research. Finally, it could be that the differences arise
because Danish wages are less rigid downwards. The aggregate figures on wage growth given
in Table 2 suggests that, if anything, the converse is the case. These show that the average
wage in Belgium declined in the year after the sample year but Danish wages did not. On the
other hand, these aggregate changes may be masking changes for displaced workers in
Denmark who take a job. Thus we need to look at what happened to the earnings and wages
of re-employed displaced workers. We shall do this shortly. For now we anticipate later
results and state that  we do not believe that the very large differences in unemployment
outcomes are attributable to an increased propensity for unemployed Danish workers to accept
lower wages.
To complement the unemployment statistics of the previous Table, in Table 7 we
present re-employment rates  at annual points in time after the displacement. These largely
confirm the analysis above - Belgian displaced workers have much lower subsequent re-
employment rates than Danish displaced workers, particularly in the year after the
displacement. One additional interesting feature in Table 7 is that we see that Belgian workers
who were in a shrinking firm in the reference year but were not displaced, are significantly
less likely to be employed in later years than ‘other’ workers. This is not the case for Denmark
- the employment rates for ‘other’ workers and workers who stayed with shrinking firms are
almost identical. Once again, the likeliest explanation for the difference is the differences in
firing costs: Danish firms  adjust more quickly to negative demand shocks and are less likely
to experience persistent downsizing.
We end the analysis of re-employment with a duration analysis of re-employment; see
Table 8. This gives the (assumed proportional) impacts of different characteristics on the
probability of being re-employed. In both countries re-employment is more likely for men, for
younger workers and for higher wage workers. The only significant difference between the
two countries is that in Belgium white collar workers have higher re-employment probabilities
whereas in Denmark the converse is true.
4.3 Post displacement wages and earnings.
We turn now to earnings and wages for those who find a job. In Table 9 we present
statistics on earnings in the years after displacement; once again these are for long tenure
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workers. The preparation of these figures makes them somewhat different from those presented
for the U.S. by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993). In the latter study the possibility of
out of state migration (with consequent attrition from the sample) meant that Jacobson et al had
to condition on having some positive earnings in all of the comparison years after the
displacement. In out analysis we only condition in being in employment at the end of the
relevant year (strictly, in November for Denmark, see Appendix B for more details). The top
panels of Table 9 present average earnings in the year, conditional on our employment
condition, so these are comparable to those given by Jacobson et al (1993). These averages
are not across the same people in each year so that employment change, wage changes and
selection are all confounded. In the lower panel of Table 9 we present mean log differences
in annual earnings as compared to the displacement year so that the comparison in any year is
with the same workers in the reference year (year 0). The most obvious feature of the lower
panels in Table 9 is the very large falls for displaced workers in Belgium in the year after
displacement. This reflects the fact that Belgian displaced workers are more likely than Danish
displaced workers to have only part year employment in the year after, even if they are back
in work one year later. There is also a strong decline in year two for Belgian ‘non-displaced
workers at shrinking firms’. This mirrors the persistence in displacement seen in Table 7.
Comparing the results for the two countries, we see that for Denmark even ‘other workers’
record a small loss in earnings (of 1.5%) over the three years whilst displaced workers have
a larger loss of 8.3%. Thus Danish displaced workers seem to have a medium run earnings
loss of about 6.8% as compared to other workers. In Belgium, however, three year earnings
losses are actually smaller for displaced workers than for ‘other workers’. Indeed, Belgian
workers who were not displaced experienced an earnings loss of 7.6% in the year after the
reference year. This is consistent with the macro evidence on wage (see also the next Table)
and employment changes in year one given in Table 2.
In Table 10, we present average wage levels and log wage changes. Once again, we
concentrate on the latter. For wages the perverse effect noted for earnings for Belgium
disappears. Now both Danish and Belgian workers show a decline relative to ‘other’ workers.
The order of the decline for Denmark is similar to that of earnings (a relative loss of 6.4% as
against a relative loss of 6.8% for earnings). This suggests that all of the relative medium run
negative impacts on earnings for Danish workers are driven by wage losses and not
employment changes. In contrast, Belgian displaced workers suffered a relative wage loss of
3.7% as against a relative earnings gain of 6%. It is important in interpreting these results to
keep in mind that we are always conditioning on being back in work at the end of the relevant
year. For the reasons discussed above, this probably does not matter much for Denmark but
in Belgium those who have found a job after a year are the exception rather than the rule. That
displaced Belgian workers who are re-employed are doing relatively better than those who
were not displaced can only be a selection effect. 
We finish our analysis with a regression analysis of the wage loss for those who are
re-employed two years after the displacement. For both countries the coefficient on lagged
wage is significantly less than unity so that higher wage workers lose relatively more.
Moreover, this effect is more pronounced for Denmark suggesting that higher wage workers
in Denmark do a good deal worse; this is consistent with the earlier analysis suggesting that
Danish workers go back to work much more quickly and suffer some wage loss as a
consequence. There is no significant effect of age for workers aged between 20 and 60 but
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workers aged over sixty who choose to go back to work suffer very large falls: 14% for
Belgium and 28% for Denmark. Both countries also show much larger wage losses for women
(15% for women relative to men for Belgium and 17% for Denmark). Given that the re-
employment probabilities seem to be lower for women than for men (see Table 8) this is
clearly an important area for future research. One other notable feature is that post-
displacement wage losses do not seem to be correlated with tenure (given the selection on
having at least three years of tenure). 
5. Conclusions.
We have compared the displacement experience in two countries - Belgium and
Denmark - that share some common features in their labour market institutions but that also
display significant differences. In particular, both have what are thought to be ‘generous’ UI
systems but firing costs in Belgium are high relative to other countries whereas firing costs in
Denmark are very low by international standards. We found that displaced workers in
Denmark are more likely to be displaced from a firm that continues in existence than are
displaced Belgian workers. This is consistent with the fact that firing costs are much higher
for Belgian firms and consequently they are less likely to shed workers if they stay in business.
Apart from this we did not find significant differences in the before-displacement
characteristics of displaced workers in the two countries. When we compare post-
displacement outcomes there are very significant differences in employment outcomes but only
relatively minor ones in wage losses for those who are re-employed. Belgian workers have
an expected unemployment spell of ten months whilst Danish workers have an expected spell
length of only six weeks. We reviewed a number of possible explanations for this difference.
In particular, we reject the proposition that the longer Belgian spells are due to the UI system
since the Danish UI system is even more likely to induce long unemployment spells. We
concluded that of all of the explanations we examine, only one is likely to be the cause of the
longer spells, namely that there are permanent differences in the demand side and Belgian
workers face a much lower arrival rate of job offers. This lower propensity to hire by Belgian
firms is consistent with the differences in firing costs. 
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Table 1: Labour market characteristics
 (Ranking out of 53 countries)
Flexible hiring and Low legislative Unemployment
firing restrictions on Insurance
firing ‘meanness’
Belgium 39 46 52
Canada 10 11 24
Denmark 1 10 46
U.K. 8 5 10
U.S.A. 7 8 5
Table 2: Macroeconomic Environment 
(Growth rates, except for unemployment rates)
Time to Displacement Year -2 -1 0 1 2
Belgium 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Denmark 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Real Growth
                                                Belgium
                                               Denmark 3.6 0.3 1.2 1.6 1.4
-1.4 1.5 -0.1 1.3 2.1
Employment
                                              Belgium -0.1 -2.0 -1.3 -1.1 0
                                             Denmark 2.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.5 0
Unemployment Rate
                                              Belgium 7.8 10.0 11.7 12.9 12.9
                                             Denmark 10.0 9.6 10.3 11.1 11.3
Inflation
                                              Belgium 7.6 8.7 7.7 6.3 5.2
                                             Denmark 3.3 4.0 4.5 4.6 2.6
Real Manufacturing Wages
                                              Belgium 1.4 -1.4 -1.7 -2.1 1.4
                                             Denmark 1.5 0.4 2.0 0.3 1.8
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Table 3: Incidence of displacement 
(percent of all workers in the private sector)
All Of which:
Displacements Firms Shrinking Firms Dying
Belgium
All displaced workers 4,78 2,67 2,11
Workers with tenure of three 3,41 1,80 1,61
or more years
Denmark
All displaced workers 6.61 4.96 1.65
Workers with tenure of three 3.45 2.84 0.61
or more years
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Table 4: Characteristics of the Displaced Workers.
(Population of workers with 3 years or more tenure)
All Displaced Workers
Belgium Denmark
Mean St. Error Mean St. Error 
Proportion Men .68 .002 .68 .020
Proportion White Collars .36 .002 .48 .021
Age 38.66 .056 41.1 .490
Tenure (Years) 5.09 .006 5.77 .088
Proportion with more than 6 Years Tenure .56 .002 .56 .496
Proportion Displaced Because of Closure 0.48 .002 0.18 .016
Average Daily Wage Lost Job (BF/DKr) 1,942 6.77 128.8 2.70
Average Size of Firm 23.37 0.82 45.7 5.39
Number of Observations: 42,255 547
Displaced Workers in Dying Firms
Belgium Denmark
Mean St. Error Mean St. Error 
Proportion Men .656 .003 .667 .049
Proportion White Collars .332 .003 .563 .051
Age 37.95 .080 40.4 1.18
Tenure (Years) 5.104 .008 5.57 .212
Proportion with more than 6 Years Tenure .567 .003 .479 .051
Proportion Displaced Because of Closure 1.000 - -
Average Daily Wage Lost Job (BF) 1,865 8.87 125.3 6.14
Average Size of Firm 20.330 1.242 27.3 4.40
Number of Observations: 20,294 96
Displaced Workers in Shrinking Firms
Belgium Denmark
Mean St. Error Mean St. Error 
Proportion Men .707 .003 .683 .022
Proportion White Collars .393 .003 .457 .023
Age 39.32 .079 41.2 .540
Tenure (Years) 5.082 .008 5.81 .097
Proportion with more than 6 Years Tenure .555 .003 .528 .023
Proportion Displaced Because of Closure 0 - -
Average Daily Wage Lost Job (BF) 2,014 10.10 129.6 3.01
Average Size of Firm 24.824 1.057 50.8 6.77
Number of Observations: 21,961 451
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Table 4: (continued)
Non-Displaced Workers in Displacing Firms
Belgium Denmark
Mean St. Error Mean St. Error 
Proportion Men .704 .002 .660 .019
Proportion White Collars .369 .002 .544 .020
Age 39.746 .057 40.7 .440
Tenure (Years) 5.772 .008 5.68 .084
Proportion with more than 6 Years Tenure .542 .003 .497 .020
Proportion Displaced Because of Closure - - -
Average Daily Wage Lost Job (BF) 2,053 8.54 127.4 2.03
Average Size of Firm 24.824 1.057 69.5 11.03
Number of Observations: 39,231 608
Other Workers
Belgium Denmark
Mean St. Error Mean St. Error 
Proportion Men .732 .000 .668 .004
Proportion White Collars .454 .000 .542 .004
Age 39.288 .010 41.0 .087
Tenure (Years) 5.386 .001 6.14 .017
Proportion with more than 6 Years Tenure .703 .000 .608 .004
Proportion Displaced Because of Closure NA - -
Average Daily Wage Lost Job (BF) 2,294 1.35 131.2 .499
Average Size of Firm 49.120 1.548 66.7 2.03
Number of Observations: 1,104,004 14,705
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Table 5: The probability of being displaced.
Belgium: Probit analysis of being displaced during 1983 (dependent variable = 1 if
displaced)
Compared with all non- displaced workers in
displaced workers displacing plants/firms
Compared with non-
Male .043 (.004) -0.008 (0.009)
White collar -0.122 (0.003) -0.014 (0.008)
log(wage) -0.291 (0.004) -0.066 (0.009)
Aged 20-29 0.153 (0.008) -0.133 (0.024)
Aged 20-39 0.161 (0.008) -0.270 (0.024)
Aged 40-49 0.161 (0.008) -0.304 (0.025)
Aged 50-59 0.172 (0.009) -0.304 (0.025)
Aged 60 or over 0.250 (0.013) -0.245 (0.032)
Tenure of one year 0.128 (0.005) -5.95 (0.062)
Tenure of two years 0.017 (0.007) -6.16 (0.063)
Tenure of three years -0.051 (0.007) -6.13 (0.063)
Tenure of four years -0.020 (0.007) -6.02 (0.064)
Tenure of five years -0.033 (0.008) -6.09 (0.064)
Tenure of six or more years -0.209 (0.005) -6.16 (0.063)
Pseudo R-squared 0.026 0.106
Sample size 1,861,806 142,275
Note:    Omitted age is 'less then 20; omitted tenure is 'less then one year'. 
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Table 5 (continued).
Denmark:Probit analysis of being displaced during 1988 (dependent variable = 1 if
displaced)
Compared with all non- displaced workers in
displaced workers displacing plants/firms
Compared with non-
Male 0.025 (0.023) 0.171 (0.048)
White collar -0.176 (0.022) -0.213 (0.047)
log(wage) -0.117 (0.025) -0.206 (0.054)
Aged 20-29 -0.112 (0.037) -0.104 (0.080)
Aged 20-39 -0.137 (0.041) -0.188 (0.088)
Aged 40-49 -0.119 (0.042) -0.236 (0.090)
Aged 50-59 -0.135 (0.048) -0.344 (0.098)
Aged over 60 0.044 (0.093) -0.160 (0.185)
Tenure of one year -0.234 (0.029) -0.279 (0.061)
Tenure of two years -0.333 (0.036) -0.414 (0.074)
Tenure of three years -0.473 (0.046) -0.539 (0.092)
Tenure of four years -0.445 (0.051) -0.463 (0.102)
Tenure of five years -0.470 (0.063) -0.407 (0.126)
Tenure of six or more years -0.594 (0.033) -0.340 (0.069)
Pseudo R-squared 0.045 0.044
Sample size 37,319 3,494
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Table 6: Unemployment for long tenure displaced workers 
Belgium Denmark 
Proportion of displaced workers with some 0.65 0.31
unemployment in the three years after displacement (.002) (.020)
For workers with some unemployment:
Mean number of months in three years after displacement 15.22 5.31
(Maximum is set to 36 months) (.068) (.585)
Percentiles:
5 0.69 0.15
10 1.38 0.24
25 4.16 0.89
50 13.86 2.09
75 25.40 5.33
90 32.10 16.73
95 33.49 25.48
Note: this does not include non-employment spells that are not registered as
unemployment.
Table 7: Re-employment
(share of workers employed)
Years after displacement: 0 1 2 3
Belgium.
Displaced workers 1.000 0.370 0.583 0.664
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Non displaced workers 1.000 1.000 0.712 0.785
at displacing firms (0.002) (0.002)
Other workers 1.000 0.930 0.871 0.892
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Denmark
Displaced workers 1.000 0.718 0.750 0.746
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Non displaced workers 1.000 1.000 0.911 0.859
at displacing firms (0.012) (0.014)
Other workers 1.000 0.957 0.918 0.879
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Proportion of workers employed at the end of the year (Belgium) or in November of the
year (Denmark).
.
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Table 8: Duration analysis of re-employment for long tenure workers
Belgium Denmark
Male 0.095 (0.014) 0.117 (0.202)
White collar 0.142 (0.013) -0.325 (0.193)
Log (wage) 0.192 (0.015) 0.221 (0.412)
Aged 20 to 29 -0.090 (0.057) -0.315 (1.08)
Aged 30 to 39 -0.200 (0.057) -0.234 (1.09)
Aged 40 to 49 -0.417 (0.058) -0.366 (1.10)
Aged 50 to 59 -0.941 (0.059) -0.577 (1.10)
Aged 60 or over -1.686 (0.075) -0.709 (1.22)
Tenure of four years -0.019 (0.020) -0.282 (0.298)
Tenure of five years 0-106 (0.021) 0.615 (0.364)
Tenure of six or more years 0.137 (0.017) 0.163 (0.230)
Sample size 42,223 135
Notes. Cox non-parametric estimation of re-employment hazard, compared to all non-
displaced workers. Only workers with three or more years of tenure. 
Omitted age is 'less than 20'; omitted tenure is 'three years'.
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Table 9: Average annual Earnings
Panel A: Average Earnings Level of Workers
Years after displacement: -1 0 1 2
Belgium (1981 BF)
Displaced Workers 397,783 327,101 366,496 370,934
(1,114) (1,354) (1,516) (1,548)
Non displaced workers at displacing 402,002 394,304 323,612 350,049
firms (1,157) (1,390) (1,435) (1,575)
Other Workers 498,963 489,596 491,471 484,745
(245) (313) (321) (330)
Denmark (1988 D.Kr)
Displaced Workers 185,375 169,031 174,887 170,386
(5,003) (4,687) (5,017) (5,199)
Non displaced workers at displacing 194,045 189,703 181,627 179,697
firms (4,350) (4,388) (4,333) (4,118)
Other Workers 201,811 197,817 197,601 196,941
(840) (865) (899) (931)
Sample selection - Denmark: Wage rate positive in November of the relevant year.
                               Belgium: Wage rate positive at end of relevant year
Panel B: Earnings Growth of Workers (log(Earnings ) - log(Earnings )t 0
Years after displacement: 1 2 3
Belgium
Displaced Workers -.393 -.094 -.026 
(.004) (.004) (.004)
Non displaced workers at displacing -.044 -.387 -.091 
firms (.002) (.004) (.004)
Other Workers -.076 -.064 -.086 
(.000)  (.000) (.000)
Denmark
Displaced Workers -.060 -.049 -.083
(.018) (.025) (.030)
Non displaced workers at displacing -.031 -.044 -.062
firms (.010) (.012) (.015)
Other Workers -.013 -.015 -.015
(.002) (.003) (.003)
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Table 10: Average wages 
Panel A: Average Wage Level of Workers
Years after displacement: -1 0 1 2
Belgium (1981 BF)
Displaced Workers 1,870 1,776 2,012 2,077
(6.52) (7.75) (5.36) (5.49)
Non displaced workers at displacing 1,824 1,882 1,773 1,716
firms (7.61) (4.414) (5.83) (6.60)
Other Workers 2,124 2,122 2,102 2,082
(0.92) (1.24) (1.16) (1.63)
Denmark (1988 D.Kr)
Displaced Workers 129 134 133 134
(2.70) (3.97) (3.82) (3.46)
Non displaced workers at displacing 127 129 132 133
firms (2.03) (2.94) (2.23) (2.31)
Other Workers 131 133 139 142
(0.50) (0.61) (0.61) (0.57)
Notes: Daily wage rates in 1981 Belgian Francs.
           Hourly wages rates in 1988 Danish kroner
Sample selection - Denmark: Wage rate positive in November of the relevant year.
                               Belgium: Wage rate positive at end of relevant year.
Panel B: Wage Growth of Workers (log(Wage ) - log(Wage ))t 0
Years after displacement: 1 2 3
Belgium
Displaced Workers -.038 -.065 -.088
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Non displaced workers at displacing .008 -.038 -.076
firms (.002) (.002) (.002)
Other Workers -.018 -.032 -.051
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Denmark
Displaced Workers -.032 -.015 .001
(.021) (.020) (.021)
Non displaced workers at displacing .004 .023 .031
firms (.008) (.010) (0.11)
Other Workers .008 .049 .065
(.002) (.002) (.002)
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Table 11: Regression analysis of wages in subsequent job.
Belgium Denmark
Log wage on lost job 0.587 (0.005) 0.382 (0.054)
20 < Age <= 30 -0.022 (0.016) 0.595 (0.133)
30 < Age <= 40 -0.006 (0.016) 0.611 (0.134)
40 < Age <= 50 -0.020 (0.016) 0.614 (0.135)
50 < Age <= 60 -0.016 (0.016) 0.498 (0.137)
Age > 60 -0.159 (0.022) 0.332 (0.215)
Male 0.148 (0.004) 0.174 (0.043)
White Collar 0.167 (0.004) 0.073 (0.041)
Tenure = 4 years 0.003 (0.006) -0.062 (0.059)
Tenure = 5 years -0.010 (0.006) -0.099 (0.068)
Tenure = 6 years or more -0.003 (0.005) -0.051 (0.049)
Lost job firm dead 0.033 (0.003) 0.027 (0.048)
Size of lost job firm 0.001 (0.001) 0.0076 (0.014)
Adjusted R-squared 0.60 0.26
Sample size 27,567 408
OLS for wage in a new job. Belgium: 1985 (two years after a displacement in 1983) 
                                             Denmark:1990 (two years after a displacement in 1988)
In both cases controls for region and occupation are included.
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Appendix A: Institutions in Belgium and Denmark. 
DENMARK
Topics in collective agreements.
In the period under consideration there were biannual centralised negotiations between
the Confederation of Danish Trade Unions (the LO) and the Confederation of the Employers
Organisation. For wages the negotiations establish a minimum wage level, so that in more
decentralised negotiations afterwards (for example at. the plant level) lower wage levels than
these would not be agreed to. Dependent on the wage settling system, there could be more
detailed provisions with respect to the wage level for single groups of workers. Other items
in the centralised wage negotiations are provisions about holidays, working hours and
overtime. Employment protection provisions played a close to negligible role in the
negotiations. With few exceptions, Danish collective agreements do not include employment
protection provisions such as advance notice and severance or redundancy pay. 
One of the reasons for this absence can be traced back to the formation of the Danish
collective bargaining system. As in most other countries employers tried to avoid recognising
the right of workers to organise and bargain collectively. After a four months long nation-wide
general lockout in 1899 the Confederation of Danish Employers conceded. In return for
recognition the trade unions granted the employers the "right to manage" in the "general
agreement" between the two organisations which was the main outcome of the conflict. The
interpretation of "right to manage" is the (nearly) unlimited formal right of the employers to
decide which workers to hire and which workers to fire.
Coverage of collective agreements.
Very firm evidence on the coverage of collective bargains in the Danish private sector
is lacking. The last and most authoritative evidence is the result of a survey of firms by
Statistics Denmark. In a survey of about 2,000 firms with more that 10 employees 69%
indicated that a majority of their employees were covered by collective agreements. When
weighted by the number of employees in the firms, thsee responses suggest that 83 percent of
workers in firms with more than 10 employees are employed in firms where the majority of
workers are covered by collective agreements. However, the coverage among firms with less
than 10 employees is probably considerably below that for larger firms (the coverage among
firms with 10-19 employees was 63 percent). Given that about twenty percent of Danish
workers work in plants with less than 10 employees and the 63 percent applies to firms with
fewer than ten workers then we get an average coverage of 79 percent. This figure is an upper
bound. If we assume 50 percent coverage for firms with less than 10 employees then we have
an overall coverage of 76 percent. On the basis of these calculation an estimate of 75 percent
coverage of collective agreements among private sector employees seems reasonable. 
The other major source of evidence is a survey of private sector employees, the results
of which are presented in Scheuer (1997).  In the survey, only 52 percent of the respondents
employed in the private sector answered that they were covered by a collective agreement.
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This figure is low as compared to other information. The survey conducted by Statistics
Denmark was carried out in order to obtain further information on the matter than the
information contained in Scheuer (1997). 
Unemployment insurance system.
At the beginning of this century the Danish state began to subsidise the unemployment
insurance system run by trade unions, who set up special unemployment insurance funds for
this task. Following a reform of the system in about 1970 the unemployment insurance funds
do not bear the marginal burden of expenditures for unemployment benefit. Each member pays
a fixed amount of fee in order to be a member and the Danish State covers the remaining part
of the expenditures. The unemployment insurance funds are in principle separate
administrative units, but in practice there is a close connection between the unions and the
unemployment insurance funds. However, the unemployment insurance funds are closely
regulated by the state with respect to benefit levels, entitlements and so on. One of the duties
resting on the unemployment insurance funds is to test that the unemployed members actually
search for a job. The general impression is that there is a considerable variation across
unemployment insurance funds with respect to the efficiency with which this task is carried
out. 
Although the administration of UI funds is in the hands of individual trade unions there
is also a government labour exchange system that is directly responsible for matching
unemployed workers and vacancies. When a firm notifies the labour exchange of a vacancy
the latter is required to identify a suitable unemployed worker and send them for interview.
If the worker is offered the job and refuses then the labour exchange is required to contact the
UI fund and the worker loses benefit for five weeks. This is the formal procedure but the
unions also take an active part in finding jobs.
It is extremely difficult to make cross-country comparisons of the "harshness" of the
pressure which unemployed are exposed to from authorities, labour unions or social norms in
society. Within Scandinavia there is no doubt that the Danish system is more easygoing than
the Swedish and the Norwegian systems. This applies both with respect to the formal rules and
with respect to the way workers are assigned to jobs. One of the reasons is that trade unions
in the other Scandinavian countries are organised as industrial unions, while the Danish ones
are organised according to trade or education. Thus the Danish system is somewhat more
hesitant with respect to the demand that unemployed should search for jobs that they have not
been educated to. 
BELGIUM
Job Protection.
Belgian workers have always afforded stable, highly protected jobs, although this is more true
for white collars than for blue collars, despite the fact that Belgian recognizes the basic
Only in a few cases (union representatives, workers on parental leave etc.) does an1
employer have to provide a ‘just cause’ for dismissal.
 The threshold between low and high wage is set by decree and is indexed.2
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principle of employment at will . Indeed, Belgian law guarantees workers long notice periods and in1
some cases generous mandatory severance payments. Notices for Blue Collars are relatively short: 4 and 8
weeks for workers with less than 20 years of service and those with more than 20 years, respectively. White
collar workers are given much longer period of notice. Low wage  White Collars are given 3 months2
of notice plus 3 months per completed five years of seniority. For high wage White Collars,
these are lower bounds. The actual period of notice has to be set in agreement between the
employer and the employee. When no accord can be reached, the length of notice is set by the
Labor Courts. Blanpain (1994) estimates that precedents tend to show that the length of notice
Courts grant to these high paid employees is a function of age, specialization, tenure and wage.
They can go as high as 36 months. Of course, all these restrictions do not apply during trial
periods (generally 2 weeks for Blue Collars, but up to six months for White Collars). It is
worth noting that during the period considered here, protections were sharply reduced for
some categories of white-collar workers. In addition to notice, Belgian workers (Blue and
White collars) are given large severance payments in case of plant closing. These payments
amount to roughly one month salary per year of seniority, plus some additional compensation
for high wage and older workers. In case of mass layoffs, some severance – although much
less generous – are due too.
Bargaining and Wages.
Belgian wages are said to be rigid. This rigidity is probably more linked to the pyramidal
bargaining taking place than to the legally minimum wages. Contracts can be bargained at the
national, industry and firm level. Agreements struck at a higher level are most often extended
to all the firms (in Belgium, for national agreements, or in the industry, for industry
agreements) and become de-facto lower bounds for bargaining at lower levels. These of
course limit the downward real wage flexibility at firm level, especially given the fact that as
a general rule, Belgian wages are automatically indexed. The main feature of the structure of
Belgian pattern of wage bargaining pertinent to this work, however, is certainly the portability
of seniority. Indeed, workers changing jobs between firms within the same bargaining unit
(often and industry) keep their accrued seniority. This of course considerably limits their
ability to accept wage cuts, even if they are willing to.
Union membership is very high in Belgium. Coverage rates are even higher.  All firms with
25 or more employees are de-facto unionized, since they have to have an elected works
council, and only union members can be elected to these councils. Non-unionized firms are
covered by any relevant contract that has been extended. Inside firms, workers can choose not
to be union members. They won't pay dues, but will be covered by all the relevant agreements.
They cannot be candidates to the works councils, but they can vote.  Finally, unions can coexist
and compete for membership inside the firm.
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Social Safety Net.
The Belgian system of unemployment insurance is said to be one of the most generous in the
world (Burda, 1991).  This belief has to be somewhat reconsidered As a general rule, benefits
do not expire in Belgium. However, they are reduced after one and two years of
unemployment.
In fact, a closer look at the Belgian UI system indicates that it hardly qualifies as an insurance
system. First, students can qualify for benefits even if they have never been employed. So can
re-entrants. The only penalty in both cases being a waiting period. Second, and more
importantly, benefits are means tested. The official replacement rate is 60% of the lost wage
during the first year of unemployment and 40% after that. Practically, these rates are
meaningless. Many UI recipients receive a compensation that is entirely based on family status
and income. Thus ‘heads’ of households receive a flat amount which can be higher than 60%
of their lost wages, whilst the benefits of most of other workers are limited by a cap on
benefits and are often below 60% of their lost wages.  Third, while there is a search
requirement attached UI benefits, this requirement is hardly enforced.
Appendix B: Data selection and definitions.
The aim of our procedures with respect to data selection and definitions of variables is to
come as close as possible to similar definitions for Belgium and Denmark, so that the results
for the two countries are as comparable as possible. When it is possible or desirable we adopt
the definitions in Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993), which is the main study on
displaced workers using administrative data for the US. This implies that the results in this
study are to a certain extent comparable to the results for the US as presented in the study by
Jacobson,  LaLonde and Sullivan (hereafter JLS). In some instances we could come close to
the JLS study for one of our countries, but not for the other one. In such cases we have chosen
to select the sample to maximise comparability between Belgium and Denmark. 
A. EMPLOYER SIDE
A1. Plants or firms
The Belgium data set contains firms but for the Danish data set the unit is plants. However, the
Danish data set contains a variable that indicates if a worker transfers from one plant to
another in the same firm. These workers are not considered displaced workers in this study,
they are placed in the control groups, i.e. the group of stayers or non-displaced workers in
displacing plants. Nevertheless, the difference between firm unit and the plant unit is probably
the major problem in this study with respect to comparability between the two countries.
The JLS study analyses firms. JLS  p. 706 states that the basic statistics are based on
“Pennsylvania Unemployment Insurance (UI) tax reports and the state ES202 data on firms’
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employment”. The issue is perhaps not quite clear, as there is no explicit discussion about
plants or firms as units. JLS, p. 687 mentions “firm” but also mentions “geographical
location”. Now, a plant has a geographical location and a single-plant firm does also have a
geographical location, while this term is not unambiguous for a multi-plant firm.
A2. Size reduction of plants or firms. 
Workers are considered displaced if they separate from a firm (Belgium) or plant (Denmark),
which experiences a 30 percent reduction in the work force from one year to the next. This 30
percent rule on plants will produce more displaced workers than the 30 percent rule applied
to firms. In general one would expect that it is more serious to separate from a downsizing firm
than from a plant, as firms can reallocate the separated workers to another plant in the same
firm. However, as just mentioned these reallocated workers are not considered displaced in
the Danish data set. 
The JLS study also applies a 30 percent downsizing threshold, see JLS, p. 688. However, they
do not apply this rule to year to year changes in employment. Instead they apply the following
rule,  JLS, p. 688: “.... separators whose firms’ employment in the year following their
departure was 30-percent or more below their maximum level during the late 1970's”. 
A3. Size of plant or firm (cut off point).
In this study we eliminate firms (Belgium) and plants (Denmark) with less than or equal to 5
employees. This cut off point is applied to one particular year. The main reason for the
comparatively small cut off point is that a higher cut off point would reduce the sample size
of displaced workers for Denmark to a too low level. 
The JLS study has a cut off point of 50 employees in one particular year. See  JLS p. 688, a
footnote “Accordingly we further restricted our sample to those whose firms had at least 50
employees in 1979".
A4. Identity of establishments (false death problem).
In Belgium firms are identified by a unique taxpayer number that can survive a change in
ownership. A firm ID number will change only if the firm disappears as a corporation (the ID
will not change if the corporation is taken over) and all its debts have been paid in full. Given
the nature of Belgian industrial organisation (big holding companies holding shares in many
corporations), corporations rarely disappear.  Although they are probably more rare than in
the US, mergers happen. Some firms also die and revive under a different name. To control
for that possibility we proceeded as follows: dying firms where at least 70% of the workers
were rehired (in order not to meet our criteria for being called a displacing firm) and 70% of
those rehired were rehired in a single firm were not considered to be displacing firms.
For Denmark, the IDA data base considers an establishment as continuing if just one of the
following four criteria is satisfied: 1) same owner and same industry, 2) same owner and same
employees, 3) same employees and same industry, or 4) same employees and same address.
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More precisely, “same industry” means the same ISIC-code at the 5 digit level, and “same
employees” in case 2, means that either at least 30% of the first employees remain at the plant
or make up at least 30% of the second-year employees, while “same employees”, in case 3
and 4, means that at least 30% of the first employees remain at the plant and make up at least
30% of the second-year employees. Moreover, a reduction in the workforce in a plant could
take place although one would not consider the workers as genuinely displaced. (a) This could
be the case if a share of the workers at a plant is taken over by another plant. The IDA data
base contains variables to take this situation into account. For continuing plants, these plants
are considered “non-identical” if at least 2 workers find employment in another plant. The
creators of the IDA data base baptized these workers "spin offs".  (b) For closed plants these
plants are considered “taken over” by another plant, if the number of the workers employed
in the other plant are at least 2 and these workers constitute at least 30 percent of the
workforce in the closed plant. In the terminology of creators of the IDA data base these
workers are "take overs". For the present purpose, i.e. to ensure maximum comparability
between Belgium and Denmark, the following rules apply: The “spin offs” in (a) will be
considered displaced workers (note that movements within a firm are given first priority, i.e.
“spin offs” within a firm are not considered displaced). The “take overs” in (b) will not be
considered displaced workers (they are placed in the category “other workers”).
In the American case, JLS, p. 707 states: “..[it is] important to account for cases in which a
firm’s employer indentification number (EIB) changes from one period to the next, ....”, and
“In cases of mergers and divestitures that occurred during the sample period, we treated the
separate parts as a single firm, even in years when they were legally distinct”. 
A5. Public sector exclusion.
The present study considers only displacement from the private sector, public sector
employees are excluded. The analysis of displacement from the public sector is problematic
both in the Belgian and the Danish case. The Belgian data set contains no observations for
some of the public sector employees. In the Danish case the present version of the IDA data
base contains considerable measurement errors with respect to plant size. The exclusion of
the public sector is only applied to the initial state. If a displaced worker get a job in the
public sector the observation is kept in the sample, and the subsequent wage rate in the public
sector job enters into the calculations. 
In the JLS study there is no explicit discussion about this topic. Perhaps native American
economist are supposed to know if the public sector is included in “ES202 data on firms’
employment”. 
B. EMPLOYEE SIDE
B1. Multiple jobholders, identification of main employer, timing during the year. 
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For Denmark the IDA definition is taken. The means that employed workers at one particular
date in the middle of November are assigned to the plant from which they got their main
earnings. For Belgium the employer that comes closest to a employment relationship in
November is taken. In most cases this amounts to the last employment relationship during the
calendar year.
In the JLS study only one employer-employee relationship within a year is allowed. JLS, p.
707, states that the relationship is taken where there is the “Greatest amount of earnings during
the year”. 
B2. Multiple jobholders, more than one employment relationship by the end of the year
For Belgium those workers who have two jobs at the time of displacement and fulfill the
tenure condition of 3 or more years of employment in both of the jobs are deleted from the
sample. For Denmark IDA contains an indication of “side employment” besides the main job
in November. The main November job is the one with the highest earnings. There is no tenure
variable for these “side jobs”. Displaced workers with “side jobs” are retained in the
calculations. 
B3. Wages.
For Belgium wages are wage income per day. The numerator is the wage income during the
year in the firm. The denominator is the number of days employed in the firm. For Denmark
wages are wage income per hour. The numerator is the wage income during the year in the
plant. The denominator is the number of estimated hours employed in the plant. The assessment
of the number of hours worked is based on weekly contributions to a pension scheme, where
the size of the contribution depends on the number of working hours. There are some
measurement errors contained in the IDA measure of the number of hours worked. 
The JLS study does not consider wages.
B4. Earnings, annual.
For both Belgium and Denmark we consider wage earnings during the calendar year. We
include the wage income from all plants or firms that the worker has been employed at during
the calendar year. Nominal earnings are deflated by the consumer price index in the two
countries (this index is also used for deflating wages). We select workers with positive wage
rates. In the Danish case we have only wage rates for workers who are employed at the
November date, where workers are assigned labor market status including plant affiliation.
These workers are the ones that are included in the table describing the development of wages
after displacement (that is the only possibility for Denmark - we do not have wage rates for
workers who are not employed at the November date). The figures that enter such an earnings
table is the early earnings (wage income) from all employers (not only the employer at the the
November date). Such an earnings table will ensure comparability with the table over wage
losses, the drop in earnings can be decomposed in a wage loss and a drop in hours. It is
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exactly the same persons which enters in the wage table and the earnings table. It means,
however, that we exclude many workers who have positive earnings during the year, but who
are not employed at the November date. E.g. workers who are unemployed most of the year,
but have just a small amount of working hours placed somewhere during the year (but not at
the November date).
We also include displaced workers who do not have a positive wage rate. In the previous
precedure we only included those worker who were so fortunate to have a positive wage rate
after the displacement. The conjection must be that those workers who do not have positive
wage rates fare worser with respect to early earnings (or income). To the extent that there is
a difference in the transition rates into other states than employment between the displaced
workers and the control group, the above selection will underestimate the drop in yearly
earnings as a consequence of displacement. A minimal extension of the sample in the previous
procedure is to include workers who have positive yearly earnings in each of the years after
displacement. This would be a sample selection where we come so close to JLS selection
scheme as we can with the data bases at hand (we will experiment with that for Denmark). A
further extension will be to extend the sample to workers who have positive earnings in just
one of the years after displacement. 
B5. Tenure condition.
In some cases we only consider displaced workers with 3 or more years of tenure at the year
of separation. In the Danish data set we run into sample size problems, if the tenure condition
is set higher. The Danish tenure variable is plant tenure while the Belgium one is firm tenure.
In the JLS study the tenure condition is higher. This study only includes “...workers who had
six or more years of tenure by the beginning of 1980" (p. 689). 
B6. Migration and commuting from the area of interest. 
In the JLS study for Pennsylvania this is potentially a severe problem. The solution applied
according to JLS, p. 689 is: “... we have eliminated from our sample the approximately 25
percent of high-tenured separators who subsequently never have positive earnings in our data”,
and  “Finally, to reduce biases due to sample attrition, we required that every worker receive
some wage or salary earnings during each calendar year.”
For Belgium and Denmark this is probably not a major problem, as the amount of commuting
and immigration to other countries is limited compared to a single state in the US.
B7. Re-employment.
In the Danish data set a worker is considered re-employed if the worker has a job the next
November, where each Danish resident is assigned one particular labour market status. For
Belgium an employment and labour market status is constructed for each worker by the end of
the year. This construction should come as close to the IDA definition as possible. 
In the JLS study workers are considered re-employed if the wage income is positive each
calendar year, JLS, p. 689.
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B8. Comparison groups (for income and wage losses).
For Belgium and Denmark we select employees in one particular year, and comparison groups
are found among these workers, i.e. workers who enter employment in the subsequent years
are excluded from the analysis. The main comparison groups to the displaced workers
considered in this study are all other workers and non-displaced workers in displacing
establishments.
The JLS study considers different variants of control groups.  JLS, p. 690 considers
“separators”, which must be all workers leaving a firm. The separators are divided in  “non-
mass lay offs” and “mass lay offs” (the displaced workers according to the different selection
criteria). The rest of the workers are labelled “stayers”.
C. OTHER ISSUES
C1. Years, sample period.
For Belgium the sample period is 1978-85. Dismissal is considered from 1983 to 1984. This
makes it possible to trace the effect of displacement two years after the displacement. The
maximum length of tenure in the Belgian data is six years. For Denmark the sample period is
1980-91. Dismissal is considered from 1988 to 1989. Calculations on the consequences two
years after displacement is possible. The maximum length of tenure in the Danish data for the
year 1988 is 8 years.
In the JLS study the sample period is 1974 through 1986. The observation unit is quarterly, the
data are quarterly observations, although some of the conditioning is performed on a yearly
basis. 
C2. Aggregate economic conditions.
For Belgium and Denmark the years of displacement were moderate to severe with  respect
to economic activity.
For the JLS study, the conditions were unusually severe in Pennsylvania.  
C3. Unemployment.
For Belgium there is information on the number of days unemployment benefit has been payed
out. There is also information on the number of days of employment. For Denmark there is
information on a quarterly basis on the share of the normal working time where unemployment
benefit has been payed out. For both Belgium and Denmark we calculate the length of the
unemployment spell after displacement before the entrance into a new job. The unit of
measurement is months. 
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